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743 
Deceptive Patents: Deconstructing Juicy Whip 
Moral utility largely prevents the granting of a patent if the patent 
would be injurious to the well-being of society. The moral utility doctrine 
has prevailed through much of American patent history and still endures 
in many parts of the world. In Juicy Whip I, the Federal Circuit chose to 
abandon the doctrine, but the court’s rationale in support of the decision 
was ill-suited. The court’s holding sanctioned deceptive patent 
applications but, intentionally or unintentionally, neglected applicable 
unfair competition, free speech, and consumer deception doctrines. In 
light of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
deceptive patents should be barred, because they convey no inherently 
useful qualities beyond deceiving consumers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are browsing the internet and an advertisement pops 
up. You are interested in the product presented and click on the ad. 
The link sends you to a separate webpage that does not actually sell 
the advertised product. Instead, it sells a knock-off product of lower 
grade and quality. This would likely be a frustrating scenario for many 
people. Now, imagine that the company that devised such a scenario 
received a patent on its advertising methods. In other words, the 
government actually rewarded this company for developing this 
deceptive bait-and-switch. As frustrating as it is, this is a possible 
scenario1 in the current state of intellectual property law due to the 
erosion of the moral utility doctrine and the development of 
deceptive patents. 
This Note calls for the revival and codification of the moral utility 
doctrine for deceptive patent applications. Specifically, it examines the 
history of the moral utility doctrine, from its inception up to its 
erosion in the 1999 case Juicy Whip I. As this Note will explain, the 
patent in question in Juicy Whip I is intentionally manufactured for 
point-of-sale deception, a pernicious type of deception. Moreover, the 
Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Juicy Whip I is flawed. First, although 
the court applauded the utility of post-sale imitative products, the 
court neglected the complications that result from condoning 
consumer confusion and deception at the point-of-sale. Second, the 
court turned a blind eye to the moral question at issue because 
Congress has not addressed deception as it applies to patents. In doing 
so, they failed to acknowledge well-established trademark and false 
advertising laws aimed to avert consumer deception. Congress need 
not expressly restrict deceptive patents where other laws and 
regulations seek to prohibit similar deceptive acts. Finally, the 
incongruity between deceptive patents and the utilitarian purposes of 
patent law should be evident. Specifically, the Constitution marshals 
the Patent and Trademark Office to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts. Promoting point-of-sale deception is contrary to 
prevailing public policy. 
 
 1.  This scenario assumes that the software claims are drafted such that they overcome 
an Alice rejection. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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This Note proceeds as follows: Part II explores the history and 
context of the moral utility doctrine. Namely, it will explain that the 
moral utility doctrine fits within the context of general patent utility 
and draws upon international origins and its affirmation throughout 
early American law. Part III examines Juicy Whip I, the foremost case 
affecting the moral utility doctrine. This section challenges the novelty 
of the Juicy Whip patent and rebuts the court’s holding by invoking 
trademark and First Amendment laws that seek to prevent consumer 
deception. Part IV juxtaposes deceptive patents against the utilitarian 
purposes of patent law. Part V discusses drawbacks associated with 
reviving the moral utility doctrine. Finally, Part VI suggests a course 
of action to reinstate the moral utility doctrine as it applies to 
deceptive patents. 
II. MORAL UTILITY HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
Moral utility is a subset of the utility doctrine, which draws its 
authority from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,2 whereby 
Congress is empowered “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”3 
The First Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790 to codify the 
Intellectual Property Clause.4 Under it, a person who “hath . . . 
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, 
or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used” 
shall be granted a patent “if [the patent examiner] shall deem the 
 
 2.  One of the objectives of this paper is to highlight the purpose of the Intellectual 
Property Clause. See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: 
Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 
2331, 2331 (2003) (noting that the Copyright and Patent Clause “until very recently . . . 
received little attention from constitutional law scholars”). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593, 634–41 (2010) (noting that scholars, courts, and legislators have interpreted the term 
“useful art” to mean “technological art” or process). 
 4.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress quickly responded to 
the bidding of the Constitution by enacting the Patent Act of 1790 during the second session 
of the First Congress.”). 
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invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to cause 
letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States.”5 
The requirement that a patent be useful, broadly known as the 
utility requirement, has four varieties derived by the courts:6 
substantial utility, specific utility, credible utility, and moral utility.7 
This paper focuses almost exclusively on moral utility. 
A. Moral Utility’s International Origins 
Moral utility, the requirement that patents should not be granted 
for inventions that are contrary to morality or public policy, 
originated, like other patent doctrines, in Europe. The 1624 Statute 
of Monopolies, the first English patent law, contained a clause 
preventing issuance of patents that were “contrary to the law,” 
“mischievous to the state,” or “generally inconvenient.”8 Later, the 
moral utility doctrine was again incorporated into one of the first 
international treaties addressing intellectual property, the 1883 Paris 
Convention. The Convention stated that the partnering countries 
could not grant patents that “mislead the public.”9 In the nineteenth 
century, European countries began to incorporate an “ordre public 
[public order] exception” into various treaties, and eventually the 
language disallowing patents that were “contrary to ordre public or 
morality” was incorporated into the 1963 Strasbourg Convention on 
the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for 
Invention.10 This language prevailed through the unification of the 
European patent system in 1973, whereby all the negotiating 
 
 5.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (amended 1793) 
(emphasis added). 
 6.  UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE MPEP § 2107.01(I) (9th ed. rev. 2015) (“Courts have used the labels ‘practical 
utility,’ ‘substantial utility,’ or ‘specific utility’ to refer to this aspect of the ‘useful invention’ 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101.”). 
 7.  1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 4.01, 4.04(2)(c)(iv) (2000). 
 8.  Chris Dent, ‘Generally Inconvenient’: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political 
Compromise, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 415, 442 (2009). 
 9.  PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 326 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley 
eds., 2014). 
 10.  Id. at 327. This was signed by Italy, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Cyprus, 
and  Switzerland. 
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countries quickly agreed that the European system should include a 
clause preventing patents that were contrary to public policy or 
morality.11 This was done without any significant discussion on the 
matter, suggesting that the public policy and morality clause was 
uncontroversial and obvious to the contracting parties.12 Ultimately, 
the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual 
property to date,13 the TRIPS agreement of 1994, incorporated 
an  optional “ordre public” clause to exclude the granting 
of  immoral  patents.14 This was signed by all 182 World Trade 
Organization countries.15 
B. Moral Utility in the United States 
Moral utility in the United States can be traced back to Justice 
Joseph Story, “one of the architects of American patent law.”16 In the 
1817 case of Lowell v. Lewis,17 he implemented the European-derived 
rule of moral utility as a bar to patentability. In Lowell, the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant’s pump had to be “a better pump than the 
common pump” to be “useful.”18 Setting a baseline for utility, Justice 
Story affirmed the issuance of the patent, stating, “All that the law 
requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to 
the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word 
‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the [Patent Act of 1793] 
in  contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.”19 Justice 
Story  cited  several inventions that would fail the moral utility 
 
 11.  Id. at 325. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org
/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2017). 
 14.  CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 62 (2000). 
 15.  Id. at 9. 
 16.  Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 254, 254 (1961) (noting that it is “often said that Story was one of the architects 
of American patent law”). 
 17.  Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568), abrogation 
recognized by In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 18.  Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019. 
 19.  Id. 
5.Spiel.FIN.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  4:06 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
748 
bar— inventions  that  “poison people,” “promote debauchery,” or 
“facilitate private assassination.”20 
Later, Justice Story reaffirmed his interpretation of the moral 
utility requirement in Bedford v. Hunt:21 
[A] useful invention, in the statute, is . . . such a one as may be 
applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an 
invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good 
order of society. . . . It is sufficient, that it has no obnoxious or 
mischievous tendency, that it may be applied to practical uses, and 
that so far as it is applied, it is salutary. If its practical utility be very 
limited, it will follow, that it will be of little or no profit to the 
inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect. The 
law . . . simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, and that the 
use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance 
or prohibit.22 
Justice Story’s interpretation was generally adopted to invalidate 
immoral patents over the next century and a half.23 Courts used the 
doctrine of moral utility to invalidate patents in two main categories: 
gambling devices (those “injurious” to the morals of society) 
and  fraudulent or deceptive devices (inventions with a 
“mischievous tendency”).24 
1. Gambling devices were generally deemed immoral 
The whittling away of the moral utility doctrine generally 
corresponds with the widespread public acceptance of gambling.25 In 
the early years of the American moral utility doctrine, courts 
invalidated patents for gambling even if they were capable of 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  “For many years, the Story view of utility . . . was generally accepted by the courts.” 
1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.02. 
 24.  Id. § 4.03; Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37. 
 25.  Laura A. Keay, Morality’s Move Within U.S. Patent Law: From Moral Utility to Subject 
Matter, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 409, 411 (2012) (asserting that “the [moral utility] doctrine’s decline 
correlates with increased public acceptance of gambling activities”). 
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substantial use apart from gambling situations.26 Throughout the 
1880s and 1890s courts denied patents for slot machines and punch-
board lottery devices.27 Interestingly, the public sentiment against 
gambling rose to such heights that “[b]y 1910 virtually all forms of 
gambling were prohibited in the [United States].”28 Later, however, 
gambling found greater acceptance as a form of economic stimulus 
during the Great Depression and was once again permitted.29 In 1977, 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences disregarded the 
application of moral utility to gambling inventions.30 On the other 
hand, the prohibition on fraudulent and deceptive inventions lasted 
longer than the prohibition on gambling inventions, as I will discuss 
in the next section.  
2. Throughout much of early American law, fraudulent and deceptive 
patents were prohibited as immoral 
Like gambling patents, fraudulent and deceptive patents were not 
allowed throughout much of the history of American patent law. The 
first instance in which the Supreme Court invalidated a patent based 
on deceptiveness was Klein v. Russel (1873).31 The patent at issue 
claimed a process for treating lamb and sheep skin to imitate the 
softness of “dogskin”32 in gloves.33 The patent intended to substitute 
a less valuable article (sheep skin) for dogskin and impose this 
impression upon the public by “representing gloves made of softened 
sheep and lamb skins as dogskin gloves.”34 In affirming the 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889) 
(denying patent on toy horse race course because it was used in bar-rooms and saloons and “no 
[other] such use has been as yet made”). 
 27.  1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.03. 
 28.  ROGER DUNSTAN, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA, at II-6 (1997), https://www.library. 
ca. gov/CRB/97/03/97003a.pdf; see also Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The 
International Law of Remote Wagering, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1159, 1162–1163 (2007) 
(recounting the three “waves” of legalized gambling in U.S. history). 
 29.  DUNSTAN, supra note 28. 
 30.  Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 29, 1977). 
 31.  Klein v. Russell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 433 (1873). 
 32.  The leather made from the skin of dogs. Dogskin, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dogskin (last visited Nov. 14, 2017). 
 33.  Klein, 86 U.S. at 445. 
 34.  Id. 
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invalidation of the patent, the Court also affirmed the trial court’s jury 
instructions that “[i]f the process patented cannot be made useful for 
any honest purpose, and can be used only for perpetrating a fraud 
upon the public, and is therefore not useful, but pernicious, the 
plaintiff cannot recover.”35 
In time, the deceptive patent assessment was modified by the 
Rickard doctrine in Rickard v. Du Bon (1900).36 The patent in 
question revealed a process for artificially producing spots on tobacco 
leaves that were used to wrap cigars. The inventor touted the process 
as producing superior burning quality for the leaf, but ultimately the 
Second Circuit found the only usefulness of the invention was to 
“counterfeit the [superior Sumatra] leaf spotted by natural causes.”37 
The Second Circuit held the patent was invalid for lack of utility and 
laid forth the Rickard doctrine: 
In authorizing patents to the authors of new and useful discoveries 
and inventions, congress did not intend to extend protection to 
those which confer no other benefit upon the public than the 
opportunity of profiting by deception and fraud. To warrant a 
patent, the invention must be useful; that is, capable of some 
beneficial use as distinguished from a pernicious use.38 
Unlike the invalidation of some gambling patents, which were 
invalidated even if they contained a non-pernicious utility, the Rickard 
doctrine does not apply to patents that confer some utility other than 
deception.39 In other words, under the Rickard doctrine, 
deceptiveness will not spoil a patent if the patent contains some other 
non-deceptive use. In that case, it seems the deceptive claim is 
immaterial to the patentability of an invention because, were it not for 
the bona fide beneficial use contained within the patent, the deceptive 
feature, by itself, would not be patentable.  
Intuitively, a purely deceptive improvement should not be 
patentable. This makes sense even with a contemporary analysis. The 
 
 35. Id. at 445, 468. 
 36. Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900). 
 37. Id. at 869–72. 
 38. Id. at 873. 
 39. Patents that contain “some beneficial use” will not fail for having “no other benefit 
upon the public than the opportunity of profiting by deception.” Id. 
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leading patent law treatise, Chisum on Patents, begrudgingly 
acknowledges the prospect of such a patent. 40 Some senior patent 
examiners today, who are not aware of the moral utility doctrine, do 
not believe that a competent patent examiner would grant a deceptive 
patent41 because it runs contrary to patent law’s supreme purpose: “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”42 Yet, the Federal 
Circuit opened up the possibility of such patents in the landmark case 
Juicy Whip I.43  
III. JUICY WHIP I 
In 1999, 180 years of American moral utility doctrine precedent44 
were abandoned in a seemingly innocuous case involving a juice 
dispenser:45 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (“Juicy Whip I”).46 
A. Juicy Whip Patent Claims 
The juice dispenser assessed in Juicy Whip I (shown in Figure 1) 
incorporates aspects of a post-mix and pre-mix juice machine. A “post-
mix” beverage dispenser stores beverage syrup concentrate and water 
separately until they are mixed shortly before the drink is dispensed. 
On the other hand, a “pre-mix” dispenser contains water and syrup 
concentrate pre-mixed in a clear bowl, ready to be dispensed.47 A pre-
mix dispenser prompts impulse buying by providing the consumer 
with a visual beverage display. However, this benefit comes at a cost: 
 
 40. Refusing to give full weight to the Juicy Whip I decision, Chisum on Patents notes, 
“[A]n invention the only use of which is to deceive or commit fraud has been deemed to lack 
utility, but the Federal Circuit’s decision in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, Inc. (1999), cast doubt 
on that proposition.” 1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.03(2). 
 41.  Personal conversation with Denver Senior Patent Examiners (Aug. 2016). 
 42.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 43.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 44.  This is the period from Justice Story’s pronouncement in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 
1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) to Juicy Whip I, 185 F.3d 1364. But see Ulrich Schatz, 
Patents and Morality, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALITY 159, 159 (Sigrid Sterckx 
ed., 1997) (asserting that barring the patenting of inventions that are contrary to public order 
and morality is “as old as patent law itself”). 
 45.  But see 1 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 4.03(2) (noting that Juicy Whip I “cast doubt” on 
the proposition that a device to commit fraud lacks utility). 
 46.  Juicy Whip I, 185 F.3d at 1364. 
 47.  Id. at 1365. 
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pre-mix dispensers require not only constant refilling, because the pre-
mix bowl has limited volume, but also frequent, laborious cleaning 
because the juice within the bowl is more vulnerable to bacterial 
contamination than juice in a post-mix dispenser.48 The patent in Juicy 
Whip I, United States Patent No. 5,575,405 (the ’405 patent), 
incorporates the better qualities of both dispensers—a simulation pre-
mix bowl that appears to dispense the beverage, but does not, and a 
post-mix dispenser and pressure tank below that actually dispenses the 
beverage (see Figure 1).49  
 
 48. Id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405 col. 2 ll. 38–44, col. 3 ll. 1–6, 33–42. 
 49. Id. col. 5 ll. 51–62. 
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Figure 1 The juice dispenser of the ’405 patent.50 Generally, 
everything above the counter [11] is the simulation pre-mix bowl and 
everything below the counter is the post-mix component.  
 
 50. Id. fig. 1. 
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Claims 1 and 2 of the ’405 patent state: 
1. In a post-mix beverage dispenser of the type having an outlet for 
discharging beverage components in predetermined proportions to 
provide a serving of dispensed beverage, the improvement 
which comprises: 
a transparent bowl having no fluid connection with the outlet and 
visibly containing a quantity of fluid; 
said fluid being resistant to organic growth and simulating the 
appearance of the dispensed beverage; 
said bowl being positioned relative to the outlet to create the visual 
impression that said bowl is the reservoir and principal source of the 
dispensed beverage issuing from the outlet; and 
said bowl and said quantity of fluid visible within said bowl 
cooperating to create the visual impression that multiple servings of 
the dispensed beverage are stored within said bowl. 
2. The post-mix dispenser of claim 1 which further comprises means 
for generating visible movement of said fluid in said bowl.51 
The sole inventive aspect of the ’405 patent is the combination 
pre-mix simulation with the post-mix dispensing mechanism—the 
illusionary aspect. All other aspects draw upon prior scientific 
knowledge. Specifically, the first post-mix soda-fountain was patented 
by William Gee in 1875,52 and pre-mix dispensers have existed at least 
since the invention of beer barrel taps. Likewise, although having 
liquid in the pre-mix bowl that is “resistant to organic growth” seems 
innovative, it is specious. Both methods specified by the ’405 patent 
by which the fluid could be resistant to organic growth were long since 
known at the time of filing. Claims 4 and 5 teach that resistance to 
organic growth can be achieved either by sterilizing the liquid or by 
using an alcohol.53 First, sterilization of a liquid is a process dating 
back to Louis Pasteur’s discovery in 1861 that heating milk and other 
liquids could kill harmful bacteria, a process appropriately named 
 
 51.  Id. col. 12 ll. 23–42. 
 52.  U.S. Patent No. 159,915 A (filed Feb. 16, 1875). 
 53.  ‘405 Patent col. 12 ll. 23–42. 
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“pasteurization.”54 Furthermore, Pasteur also proved that a closed 
environment, such as the sealed55 pre-mix bowl in the ’405 patent, 
would not culture any bacteria.56 Second, preventing bacterial growth 
by using alcohol to disrupt the cell membranes and denature proteins 
of vegetative bacterial cells was a method employed as early as 
200 AD.57 
Ultimately, the primary purpose of the ’405 patent is to trick 
consumers into thinking they are receiving something that they are 
not. It gives the appearance of dispensing unadulterated, natural juice 
but only dispenses canned concentrate. In the preferred embodiment 
of the ’405 patent, the pre-mix bowl would hold antifreeze fluid58 with 
a dye to simulate any color of liquid desirable.59 By way of example, 
the preferred embodiment lays out how the antifreeze fluid could 
simulate orange juice. It states that “[t]he formulation may be 
rendered cloudy and opaque by adding a suitable dispersoid . . . for 
example an alkenyl modified oxyalkylene polymer to simulate a pulpy 
beverage such as orange juice.”60 However, although the appearance 
of the pre-mix container would simulate a pulpy, fresh, organic orange 
juice with dispersed pulp-like chemicals, the liquid coming out of the 
Juicy Whip post-mix container cannot be a pulpy juice. Chemistry and 
Technology of Soft Drinks and Fruit Juices, a compilation of articles 
written by veteran food scientists and intended for graduate students 
 
 54.  JEFFREY C. POMMERVILLE, ALCAMO’S FUNDAMENTALS OF MICROBIOLOGY: BODY 
SYSTEMS EDITION 9–11, 16 (2d ed. 2013). 
 55.  ‘405 Patent col. 5 ll. 59–62. 
 56.  POMMERVILLE, supra note 54, at 8–11, 16. 
 57.  JEFFREY C. POMMERVILLE, ALCAMO’S FUNDAMENTALS OF MICROBIOLOGY 211–12 
(9th ed. 2011); Yosef Ali et al., Alcohols, in DISINFECTION, STERILIZATION, AND PRESERVATION 
229 (Seymore S. Block ed., 5th ed. 2001); see also id. (stating that “[a]lcohol is perhaps the 
oldest of antiseptic agents”). 
 58.  ‘405 Patent col. 6 ll. 1–2 (“A preferred fluid is an alcohol, such as polypropylene 
glycol by way of example.”). Antifreeze mainly consists of polyethylene glycol or polypropylene 
glycol. An Introduction to Coolant Technology, RECOCHEM INC., (last visited Nov. 14, 2017), 
http://www.coolantexperts.com/coolant_overview/; see also Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, 
Inc. (Juicy Whip II), 292 F.3d 728, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Well, I was speaking to Dave Fox . . . 
and what he had done is said he had a fluid like an antifreeze fluid that there would be no 
spoilage but looked like his fruit punch Ole drink . . . .”). 
 59.  Juicy Whip II, 292 F.3d at 739 (testimony stating “if it was Orange Bang it would 
be orange. If it was Punch Bang, it would be red”); ‘405 Patent col. 5 ll. 13–19. 
 60.  ‘405 Patent col. 6 ll. 8–12. 
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going into production, marketing, or quality control in the soft drink 
industry, stipulates that 
No matter how fine it is, pulp in a carbonated post-mix syrup will 
inevitably lead to a blockage in the system, for it will rise to the top 
in the [syrup container] and then enter the valve in a concentrated 
form. Accordingly, fruit drinks must be reformulated for dispensing 
by replacing conventional concentrated juices and comminutes with 
clarified [pulpless] concentrated juice.61 
Natural fruit juices have a variety of health benefits,62 and pulp is 
an indicator of those benefits.63 Nevertheless, even if the concentrate 
were healthier than the natural fruit juice, consumers are entitled to 
differentiate between commodities and select their product of choice.  
Imitating natural, unfiltered juice, while providing something else, is 
manifestly deceptive because it leads consumers to believe they are 
purchasing something that they are not. 
The dispensing function of the ’405 patent is also illusionary. The 
’405 patent contains an agitating function to make it appear that the 
pre-mix fluid is flowing out of the dispensing outlet. Claim 2 requires 
that the antifreeze inside of the bowl create “visible movement,”64 
which is done by creating artificial movement. The fluid is agitated by 
a mechanical device to make it appear like the juice is flowing from the 
transparent pre-mix bowl above the dispensing outlet when it is not.65 
 
 61. CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF SOFT DRINKS AND FRUIT JUICES 365 (Philip A. 
Ashurst ed., 2d ed. 2005). Note that the juice dispenser shown in the drawing and notated in 
the “Description of the Preferred Embodiment” of the ‘405 patent is a carbonation-propelled 
system. ‘405 Patent col. 7 ll. 20–38, fig.1. Uncarbonated juice dispensers “operate on a post-
mix basis, using as a ‘syrup’ aseptically filled concentrated juice (diluted to a suitable viscosity). 
Sometimes a low level of sulphur dioxide is added to protect juice in the dispense valve, which 
for citrus juices must be modified to cope with high pulp content.” CHEMISTRY AND 
TECHNOLOGY OF SOFT DRINKS AND FRUIT JUICES, supra at 367. 
 62.  Peggy J. Noonan, Juice Up Your Diet, CNN,  http://www.cnn.com/2008/
HEALTH/diet.fitness/06/11/cl.antioxidant.juices/ (last updated June 11, 2008, 9:33 AM). 
 63. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDE 1-11 (2011), http
://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/trademarks/resources/ExamGuide1-11.doc (comm-
enting on the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §1203.02(d)(i), which stipulates, 
“[A] perceived health benefit from an ingredient or feature generally supports a presumption 
that the ingredient or feature is material to a consumer purchasing decision”). 
 64.  ‘405 Patent, col. 12 ll. 41–42. 
 65.  Id. col. 6 ll. 2–4 (stating that the preferred embodiment provides the means “for 
agitating the fluid to effect the appearance that it is flowing freshly into the container). 
5.Spiel.FIN.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  4:06 PM 
743 Deceptive Patents 
 757 
The agitator itself is not new,66 but the combination of the “visual 
impression that said [pre-mix] bowl is the reservoir and principle 
source of the dispensed beverage”67 combined with the agitating 
function inside the bowl is the innovative aspect that the patent claims. 
This is misleading and a main component of the patent’s 
deceptive nature. 
In summary, the preferred embodiment of the ’405 patent displays 
colored antifreeze with pulp-like components to make it appear like 
fresh orange juice is flowing out of the top bowl when, in fact, 
concentrated, pulpless juice is flowing out of a box hidden beneath 
the dispensing machine. 
B. Juicy Whip Holding and Its Flaws 
The Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip I never fully judged the 
deceptiveness of the ’405 dispenser, partly because the appellees 
seeking to invalidate the patent, Orange Bang, did not assert the facts 
stated above.68 Even so, the court stated in dicta that “even if the use 
of a reservoir containing fluid that is not dispensed is considered 
deceptive, that is not by itself sufficient to render the invention 
unpatentable.”69 In a brief line of reasoning the court cited two 
rationales: first, it is not unusual for a product to appear to be 
something it is not, and second, the Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) is not entrusted to be arbiters of deceptive trade practices, 
a responsibility that the court thought should be left to the Federal 
Trade Commission or the Food and Drug Administration.70 
Ultimately, the court’s holding expressed a deferral of responsibility 
and a metaphorical “washing of hands”: 
Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of 
inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including 
 
 66.  Disclosure of the patent reveals that agitators have been used in an assortment of pre-
mix machines. Id. col. 3 l. 20. 
 67.  Id. col. 12 ll. 33–35. 
 68.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1367–68 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“Orange Bang has not argued that it is unlawful to display a representation of the 
beverage in the manner that fluid is displayed in the reservoir of the invention, even though the 
fluid is not what the customer will actually receive.”). 
 69.  Id. at 1368. 
 70.  Id. at 1367–68. 
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deceptiveness. . . . Until such time as Congress does so, however, we 
find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled 
unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity 
to fool some members of the public.71 
In the following paragraphs, I will explain why the court’s holding 
in Juicy Whip I was incorrect, as a matter of both law and public policy. 
First, the ’405 patent fails the Rickard doctrine because it confers no 
other benefit than deception and fraud. Second, the ’405 patent 
exploits an especially pernicious type of deception—point-of-sale 
deception. Third, the USPTO is a capable arbiter of deceptive trade 
practices, as they already regulate deceptive trademarks. Fourth, 
deceptive patents fly in the face of First Amendment case law that 
affords no protection to deceptive commercial speech.  
1. The ’405 patent fails the Rickard doctrine 
As discussed above, the ’405 patent employs two deceptive 
mechanisms: (1) a concoction of artificial elements in the pre-mix 
bowl gives the appearance that fresh, unadulterated juice will dispense 
out of the reservoir and (2) an agitator function simulates flow such 
that the consumer believes pre-mix liquid is flowing into his cup. In 
total, the ‘405 patent confers no benefit other than deception.  
It should be mentioned that the ’405 patent could, apart from the 
preferred embodiment, function in a minimally deceptive way. For 
example, if an owner of the ’405 dispenser stored the same artificial 
juice in the pre-mix bowl as that coming from the post-mix dispenser, 
customers would be ignorant only as to the inner-workings of the juice 
dispenser. Customers would get the juice they wanted (artificial juice), 
just not in the manner they assumed. The company has no intention 
of deceiving customers in this scenario, and giving the court the 
benefit of the doubt, this might be what the Federal Circuit had in 
mind when it assessed the ’405 Patent;72 however, if that was the case, 
the court should not have labeled the ’405 Patent as a deceptive 
 
 71.  Id. at 1368. 
 72.  Id. at 1367–68 (“Orange Bang has not argued that it is unlawful to display a 
representation of the beverage in the manner that fluid is displayed in the reservoir of the 
invention, even though the fluid is not what the customer will actually receive.”). 
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invention,73 nor should it have overturned the Rickard doctrine or 
engaged in a deceptiveness analysis. Multiple legitimate products fit 
into a general class of inventions that, in a broad sense, ‘fool some 
members of the public’ only because the consumer is unaware of the 
product’s functionality. For example, the large majority of automobile 
owners and technology users have no idea how their product works, 
only that it produces the result they desire.74 Yet, no one would 
justifiably classify those products as “deceptive.” In essence, the 
court’s use of the word “deceptive” was a misnomer. Granted, the 
least deceptive use of the juice dispenser is not extremely pernicious, 
but allowing all deceptive patents, even extremely pernicious patents, 
because the ’405 patent is innocuous is shortsighted. 
This critique aside, the ‘405 patent, as understood by the court, 
fails the Rickard doctrine because it has no use besides a 
pernicious use. 
2. Imitative deception is particularly pernicious at the point of sale 
In stating that it is common for products to appear as something 
they are not—the Federal Circuit’s first rationale in concluding that 
the ‘405 patent is a permissible deception—the court neglected to 
distinguish between pernicious and non-pernicious consumer 
deception. The court referenced several imitative products to buoy 
their argument: cubic zirconium is designed to imitate a diamond, 
imitation gold leaf is designed to simulate real gold leaf, synthetic 
fabrics are designed to simulate expensive natural fabrics, imitation 
leather is designed to look like genuine leather, laminate flooring is 
designed to look like hardwood flooring, and imitation hamburgers 
are designed to look like real hamburgers.75 
Although the court did not specify when the imitation was 
occurring, each favorable instance the court utilized is, essentially, an 
example of “post-sale confusion” that is unrelated to the type of 
 
 73.  Id. at 1368 (“Moreover, even if the use of a reservoir containing fluid that is not 
dispensed is considered deceptive, that is not by itself sufficient to render the 
invention unpatentable.”) 
 74.  In that case, the product is just a “black box” to those consumers, where they put 
something into the device and it spits something out. 
 75.  Id. at 1367–68. 
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deception resulting from the Juicy Whip I dispenser. Post-sale 
confusion, a concept employed mainly in the context of trademark law, 
is confusion by the general public after a sale has occurred. This differs 
from “point of sale” confusion, where the purchaser is confused as to 
the source and quality of the product when the purchase is made. For 
example, post-sale confusion might occur if an auto-body mechanic 
accepted orders to re-shape a Pontiac to imitate the body style of a 
limited edition Ferrari.76 The consumer who requested the alterations 
would know exactly where the car was initially manufactured, but as it 
is driven down the road the general public may be deceived into 
thinking it is a Ferrari because of its strikingly similar body style.77 In 
other words, post-sale confusion occurs when the purchaser of a good 
is not confused as to the source or quality of the good at the time of 
purchase, but others who see the product later are confused 
or misled.78 
The important distinction between these two types of confusion 
is that the imitative usefulness of the products cited by the Juicy Whip 
I court (cubic zirconium, laminate flooring, imitation leather) occurs 
after the purchase has been made. A cubic zirconium ring may be 
useful in intimating to friends and colleagues that a person can afford 
a diamond much more expensive than they actually can. However, the 
buyer of a diamond ring would be thoroughly distraught to discover 
that the stone is actually cubic zirconium, possessing only a fraction of 
the value and quality the buyer had assumed.79 True, synthetic fabrics 
and laminate flooring are useful in their imitative form, possessing 
tensile strength and hardness, but their imitative usefulness is nullified 
if the consumer cannot differentiate qualities of products at the point 
of sale. This is the distinction the court should have drawn: many 
products have imitative usefulness outside of the point of sale, but the 
imitative usefulness is negated when it deceives customers as they are 
 
 76.  Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 77.  Id. at 1243. 
 78.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 23:5 (4th ed. 2011). 
 79.  See Guides for the Jewelry, Precious Metals, and Pewter Industries, 16 C.F.R. § 23.1 
(2017) (“It is unfair or deceptive to misrepresent the type, kind, grade, quality, quantity, metallic 
content, size, weight, cut, color, character, treatment, substance, durability, serviceability, origin, 
price, value, preparation, production, manufacture, distribution, or any other material aspect of 
an industry product.”). 
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purchasing those products. True, point-of-sale deception may increase 
sales, but as a matter of public policy, laws generally favor protecting 
buyers over sellers.80 
The court tried to rationalize the point-of-sale deception by 
casting the ’405 patent as a post-mix machine imitating a pre-mix 
machine,81 but the relevant customers are not buying the machine, 
they are buying the juice within the machine. Furthermore, even if 
purchasers were buying the machine, they would be displeased to 
discover that they were deceived at the point of sale, and what they 
thought to be a pre-mix dispenser was actually a post-mix dispenser in 
disguise. Either way, the imitative usefulness is virtually nullified if the 
customer cannot evaluate the qualities of the product they are buying 
at the point of sale. 
Thus, the imitative nature of the ’405 dispenser is unlike the 
simulative products the court cited, because it produces deception at 
the point of sale. 
3. Current practices demonstrate the USPTO is a capable arbiter of 
deceptive trade practices 
The court in Juicy Whip I reasoned that the USPTO is not charged 
to be the arbiter of deceptive trade practices, but by doing so, the 
court disregarded trademark law, the Federal Circuit’s own deceptive 
trademark analysis, appropriate jurisdictional scope, and the 
constitutional authority granted by the Intellectual Property Clause. 
First, the USPTO is entrusted to prevent consumer deception 
explicitly by trademark statute. In the Lanham Act, Congress gave the 
USPTO the right to refuse registration of trademarks that are 
“immoral” or “deceptive,”82 and deceptive trademarks may be 
 
 80.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (“The 
law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is 
with protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the 
creation of ‘quasi-property rights’ in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of 
consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.”). 
 81.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“Thus, in this case the claimed post-mix dispenser meets the statutory requirement 
of utility by embodying the features of a post-mix dispenser while imitating the visual appearance 
of a pre-mix dispenser.”). 
 82.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
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canceled in a proceeding with the USPTO at any time.83 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed this practice as recently as December 2015: 
Under the Lanham Act, the PTO must register source-identifying 
trademarks unless the mark falls into one of several categories of 
marks precluded from registration. . . . Many of these categories bar 
the registration of deceptive or misleading speech, because such 
speech actually undermines the interests served by trademark 
protection and, thus, the Lanham Act’s purposes in providing for 
registration. For example, a mark may not be registered if it 
resembles a registered mark such that its use is likely to “cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” § 2(d), or if it is 
“deceptively misdescriptive,” § 2(e). These restrictions on 
registration of deceptive speech do not run afoul of the First 
Amendment. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“The government may ban 
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to 
inform it.”).84 
In re Budge provides the prototypical example of a deceptive 
trademark.85 In this case a company appealed a rejection for 
registration by the USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board for 
their mark “LOVEE LAMB.”86 Although the name implied natural 
materials made of sheepskin, the company sold only synthetic 
automotive seat covers.87 Due to its deceptive nature, the court found 
the mark deceptively misdescriptive.88 Furthermore, by building upon 
two tests formulated by the USPTO’s Trademark Board, the court set 
 
 83.  15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012). 
 84.  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The Supreme 
Court recently reviewed In re Tam, striking down the “disparagement” clause of the Lanham 
Act as a violation of the First Amendment. However, in doing so, the Supreme Court implicitly 
ratified the Lanham Act’s prohibition on deceptive trademarks. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 
1744, 1753 (2017) (“[A] trademark cannot be registered if it is ‘merely descriptive or 
deceptively misdescriptive’ of goods, § 1052(e)(1), or if it is so similar to an already registered 
trademark or trade name that it is ‘likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive,’ § 1052(d).”) 
 85.  In re Budge Mfg., 857 F.2d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 86.  Id. at 774. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 775–77. 
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forth the current test for deceptiveness in trademarks.89 In other 
words, the Federal Circuit has relied upon the USPTO’s own 
arbitration of deceptive trade practices to formulate its standard for 
deceptive trade practices.90 Declaring that the USPTO is not 
directed  to or capable of assessing deceptive trade practices is 
historically inaccurate. 
The Juicy Whip I court asserted that the USPTO is not designated 
as an arbiter of deceptive trade practices, but the USPTO 
accomplished that directive in the realm of patents for 180 years 
before Juicy Whip I, with no disapproval from Congress. The fact that 
Congress chose not to alter the moral utility doctrine  in the many 
revisions to the Patent Act from 1790 to 1950 is compelling evidence 
that the USPTO is a capable arbiter of deceptive trade practices.91  
Third, if deceptive patents like those in Juicy Whip I were policed 
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug 
Administration, as the court suggests, it would blur jurisdictional 
lines. The Supreme Court has indicated that it is not the prerogative 
of the Federal Trade Commission to invalidate patents.92 
Furthermore, a deceptive patent would be enjoined only if it was 
exceptionally bad, such that it caught the attention of those federal 
agencies.93 On the other hand, it would not require much more of a 
 
 89.  Id. at 775; In re Shapely, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 72, 73 (T.T.A.B. 
1986); In re Simmons, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 331 (T.T.A.B. 1976). The benchmark for 
deceptiveness in trademarks is “(1) Is the term misdescriptive of the character, quality, function, 
composition or use of the goods? (2) If so, are prospective purchasers likely to believe that the 
misdescription actually describes the goods? (3) If so, is the misdescription likely to affect the 
decision to purchase?” Budge, 857 F.2d at 775. With some modification, this test could be 
applied to deceptive patent applications. 
 90.  Budge, 857 F.2d at 775. 
 91.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 636 (2010) (noting that “the Patent Act was 
amended, revised or codified some 50 times between 1790 and 1950” (citing Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966))). 
 92.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our 
cases establish that antitrust law has no business prying into a patent settlement so long as that 
settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what the patent itself 
conferred—unless, of course, the patent was invalid, but that again is a question of patent law, 
not antitrust law.”). 
 93.  See Thomas B. Pahl, Stick with Security: Insights into FTC Investigations, FTC (July 
21, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/07
/stick-security-insights-ftc-investigations (“We like to think of the FTC as a small federal agency 
that – in appropriate circumstances – can pack a powerful law enforcement punch. But we’re 
always conscious of the need to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. Sometimes a company’s 
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USPTO examiner to concurrently assess the deceptive nature of an 
invention while assessing novelty, obviousness, patentable subject 
matter, and utility in general. Patent examiners become intimately 
familiar with technologies as they assess them over months or years, 
and the deceptive nature of a patent should be evident to the 
ordinary examiner.  
Finally, patent examiners have greater constitutional authority to 
assess deceptive patents than trademark examiners. Trademark law, 
wherein the USPTO currently assesses deceptive trade practices, is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but draws its legitimacy from 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. This clause is a broad 
authorization that has been used to justify regulations applicable to 
everything from racial discrimination94 to homegrown marijuana.95 In 
contrast, the utility requirement for patents and copyrights is explicit 
in the Constitution: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”96 As 
discussed above, point-of-sale deception does not convey any 
usefulness or utility as required by the Constitution. When something 
is explicitly found in the Constitution, it receives more deference than 
ordinary congressional directives.97 Accordingly, the USPTO should 
be given the authority to evaluate usefulness and invalidate deceptive 
patent applications. 
The USPTO is a capable arbiter of deceptive trade practices as 
shown by trademark law, the federal circuit’s deceptiveness analysis 
formulated from the USPTO’s deceptiveness analysis, and the 
USPTO’s constitutional and jurisdictional scope to grant and 
invalidate patents. 
 
practices may raise initial concerns, but there are other factors that suggest law enforcement 
wouldn’t be in the public interest.”). 
 94. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 95. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added) (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
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4. Deceptive patents are a loophole in the laws seeking to prevent 
consumer deception 
The foremost point the court makes in Juicy Whip I is that 
“Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable 
for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness.”98 Although 
Congress has not spoken specifically about deceptiveness in patent 
utility, a significant amount of federal code, regulation, and case law is 
devoted to eliminating deceptive trade practices similar to those 
implicated in Juicy Whip I and will be discussed hereinafter. Allowing 
the USPTO to invalidate deceptive patents would be consistent with 
the congressional intent and policy objectives indicated in 
these enactments. 
a. Federal laws seek to prevent consumer deception. As part of federal 
Trademark law, Congress enacted 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which makes a 
person liable in a civil action if they “in connection with any goods or 
services . . . use[] . . . any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents 
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her 
or another person’s goods.”99 This is the very center of Trademark law, 
the prevention of consumer confusion.100   
Furthermore, in 1967 Congress enacted the Fair Packaging and 
Labeling Act (FPLA) to protect customers in the marketing of 
consumer goods.101 In the declaration of policy, Congress proclaimed 
that “[i]nformed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient 
functioning of a free market economy. Packages and their labels 
should enable consumers to obtain accurate information as to the 
quantity of the contents and should facilitate value comparisons.”102 
 
 98.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 99.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
 100.  “Likelihood of confusion” is the central test for common-law and statutory 
trademark infringement. The test is whether the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion, 
to cause mistake, or to deceive. MCCARTHY, supra note 78, § 23:1. 
 101.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1461 (2012). 
 102.  Id. § 1451. 
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Although this Act excludes unpackaged goods,103  such as the juice in 
the ’405 patent, the wording conveys what appears to be Congress’s 
wide-ranging goal—“to prevent the deception of consumers or to 
facilitate value comparisons as to any consumer commodity.”104 
Although it is true that Congress has not spoken specifically 
concerning the moral utility of patents, the reasoning in Juicy Whip I 
that Congress is free to enact a law to prevent deceptive patents 
ignores other laws Congress has already enacted. 
b. Federal regulations seek to prevent consumer deception. Along 
with Congress’s laws to prevent consumer deception, many 
regulations have been enacted to prevent consumer deception in a 
wide array of industries.105 Analogous to the soft-drink industry and 
the ‘405 patent, regulations have been enacted to curb deception in 
the advertising of distilled spirits. The code specifies that: 
An advertisement of distilled spirits shall not contain: 
. . . . 
(h) Deceptive advertising techniques. Subliminal or similar 
techniques are prohibited. “Subliminal or similar techniques,” as 
used in this part, refers to any device or technique that is used to 
convey, or attempts to convey, a message to a person by means of 
images or sounds of a very brief nature that cannot be perceived at a 
normal level of awareness.106 
The visual display bowl in the ‘405 patent is a veritable 
advertisement for the drink that is dispensed: “a message to a person 
by means of images.”107 Although the court is not bound by this 
 
 103.  Id. § 1459. 
 104.  Id. § 1454. 
 105.  See, e.g., Guides for the Nursery Industry, 16 C.F.R. §§ 18.1–.8 (2017) (preventing 
deceptive practices in the nursery industry); Guides for the Rebuilt, Reconditioned and Other 
Used Automobile Parts Industry, 16 C.F.R. §§ 20.1–.3 (2017) (deception in the used 
automobile parts industry); Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.1–.5 (2017) (addressing deception in endorsements and 
testimonials in advertising); Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. 
§§ 260.1–.17 (2017) (deception in environmental marketing); Funeral Industry Practices, 16 
C.F.R. §§ 453.3–.8 (2017) (addressing deception in funeral industry practices). 
 106.  Advertising of Distilled Spirits, 27 C.F.R. § 5.65(a), (h) (2017) (emphasis omitted); 
see also Advertising of Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.64 (2017) (similar regulation for the advertising 
of wine). 
 107.  27 C.F.R. § 5.65(h). 
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regulation in the ‘405 Patent’s context, the court turned a blind eye 
to the deceptive advertising technique in the ‘405 patent instead of 
prohibiting it. 
c. First Amendment case law seeks to prevent consumer deception. 
The Juicy Whip invention violates First Amendment protections. The 
invention 1) proposes a commercial transaction, 2) misleads the 
consumer, and 3) lacks a disclaimer to dissipate potential consumer 
deception. The visual display bowl of the ‘405 patent assumes the 
basic features of an advertisement. As stated in the ‘405 patent 
disclosure, the pre-mix bowl is a “visual beverage display that 
is  a  powerful merchandising tool for stimulating impulse 
buying.”108  Essentially, the pre-mix bowl “propose[s] a commercial 
transaction,”109 which is a signifier of commercial speech and deserves 
a separate First Amendment analysis.110 Normally, speech that is false 
is protected by the First Amendment unless the speaker is motivated 
by actual malice;111 however, commercial speech that is false and 
misleading is wholly unprotected.112 This type of speech, found in 
commercial advertising, is designated as “lower value” speech.113 It 
receives less protection than political speech or even hate speech 
because it is much easier to verify. A person who creates and advertises 
a product knows its specifications and, as such, incurs greater liability 
for propagating falsity.114 
 
 108.  U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405 col. 1 ll. 47–49. 
 109.  Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
385 (1973). 
 110.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
562 (1980). 
 111.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
 112.  Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 777–
78 (1976). Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (“The evils of false 
commercial speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions, 
together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to control falsehoods, explain why 
we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of most other speech.”). 
 113. See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
2166 (2015). 
 114.  Va. State Bd. of Pharm. 425 U.S. at 777–78 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“The advertiser’s access to the truth about his product and its price substantially eliminates any 
danger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill 
accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression. There is, therefore, little need to sanction 
some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”). 
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The doctrine that “the Constitution accords less protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms 
of expression” is telling.115 Politically false statements and hate speech 
are accepted in the marketplace of ideas with the presumption that the 
truth will eventually rise to the top, but this is not tolerated in the 
marketplace of ideas for commercial speech. This is due to the 
government’s substantial interest in facilitating commerce by 
“insuring [sic] that the stream of commercial information flow[s] 
cleanly as well as freely.”116 
In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,117 the Supreme Court set forth a seminal test 
for assessing the protections afforded to commercial speech. The 
analysis balances the nature of the speech and the government interest 
asserted.118 However, the test completely excludes commercial speech 
that is false, illegal, or deceptive, concluding that “[t]he government 
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public 
than to inform it.”119 If the court would have applied the First 
Amendment in Juicy Whip I, the ‘405 patent’s ability to deceptively 
advertise and propose a commercial transaction would likely have 
been forbidden. 
Finally, as demonstrated by the requirements in the Fair Packaging 
and Labeling Act above, Congress may compel speech in certain 
circumstances, even though “compelling speech raises a First 
Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech.”120 In the 
commercial context, the government can compel speech because “the 
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is 
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such 
speech provides.”121 There is little value in consumer deception, hence 
“warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in 
 
 115.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1983). 
 116.  Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 772. 
 117.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y, 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). 
 118.  Id. at 563. 
 119.  Id. at 563–64. 
 120.  Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 505 (1997) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 121.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985). 
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order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or 
deception.”122 As discussed in the following paragraph, the inventors 
of the ‘405 patent thought to use a disclaimer with their invention but 
chose not to do so.   
After Juicy Whip I, a second suit ensued seeking to invalidate the 
‘405 patent for, among other grounds, inequitable conduct (“Juicy 
Whip II”).123 Originally, after a phone conversation with the California 
Department of Health Services, the inventors of the ‘405 juice 
dispenser intended to put a disclaimer on the pre-mix juice bowl 
because they were concerned “that the department [of Health 
Services] would have an objection to the dispenser because of 
potential consumer confusion.”124 Gus Stratton, one of the inventors 
of the ‘405 dispenser,125 drafted a letter to the California Department 
of Health Services stating that a disclaimer sticker would be placed on 
the bowl indicating that the liquid in the clear bowl is “for advertising 
purposes only,” with a sketch of a dispenser included in the letter.126 
However, the letter was never mailed, and the examining USPTO 
officer never received a copy of it.127 The court in Juicy Whip II did 
not find this evidence probative because, as they concluded in Juicy 
Whip I, “an invention’s deceptive nature has no bearing upon its 
utility.”128 However, this indicates the inventors of the ‘405 patent 
comprehended the marketing nature129 of the juice dispenser. The 
clear pre-mix bowl functioned as nothing more than a visual 
advertisement, and it should have been treated as such. 
Had the court assessed the speech value of the clear pre-mix bowl 
it would have applied intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech 
based upon the visual advertising functions of the bowl,130 and it 
 
 122.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982). 
 123.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip II), 292 F.3d 728 (2002). 
 124.  Id. at 735. 
 125.  U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405. 
 126.  Juicy Whip II, 292 F.3d at 735. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 745. 
   129.  U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405 col. 1 ll. 47–49 (stating that a pre-mix bowl is a “visual 
beverage display that is a powerful merchandising tool for stimulating impulse buying”). 
 130.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980) (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising.”). 
5.Spiel.FIN.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  4:06 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
770 
would have found that it was unprotected commercial speech because 
of its misleading and deceptive nature—step one of the Central 
Hudson analysis.131 In other words, the deceptive simulating function 
of the pre-mix bowl could have been prohibited because “there can 
be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful 
activity.”132 
In sum, the Juicy Whip invention directly runs afoul of First 
Amendment protection: 1) the pre-mix bowl operates as an 
advertising mechanism that proposes a transaction, 2) the 
advertisement is misleading, and 3) no warning or disclaimer is used 
to correct its misleading nature. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY 
Deceptive patents should be prohibited, for one reason, because 
they counteract the utilitarian objectives of patent law. It is broadly 
accepted that the purpose of the patent system is utilitarian—to 
promote innovation.133 To achieve this purpose, a simple quid pro quo 
is required: a quasi-monopoly is created in exchange for the usefulness 
of the invention. The invention is useful in itself, in that it allows the 
public access to buy and use it, but the disclosure also advances the 
progress of science by disseminating how to create or practice the 
invention. This balance of interests between incentives for the inventor 
and benefits to the public is something that the legislature has 
grappled with for some time.134 
Thomas Jefferson, although uncomfortable with granting limited 
monopolies, conceded to the idea upon a utilitarian basis. In 
correspondence with James Madison in 1788 Jefferson wrote: “[I]t is 
better to . . . abolish . . . Monopolies, in all cases, than not to do it in 
any . . . . The saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the 
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. (“The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the 
public than to inform it.”). 
 133.  David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for 
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2009). 
 134.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 636 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he Patent 
Act was amended, revised, or codified some fifty times between 1790 and 1950” (quoting 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966))). 
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incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a 
monopoly for a limited time, as of 14. [sic] years . . . .”135 Madison 
replied, “With regard to Monopolies they are justly classed among the 
greatest nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as 
encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are 
not too valuable to be wholly renounced?”136 Later, Jefferson stated 
the rationalization of granting patents as “drawing a line between the 
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an 
exclusive patent, and those which are not.”137 Surely if commercially-
sound inventions are hardly worth the embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent, deceptive patents are not. 
Ultimately, the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution is 
the highest authority on the utilitarian rationale of intellectual 
property: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by 
way of “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”138 
The Constitution states the foremost purpose of intellectual property 
is to promote the progress of science and useful arts, and the means 
to fulfill that end is giving exclusive rights to writings or discoveries. 
If the trade-off is a utilitarian one, not merely a property or 
common law right,139 what benefit is derived from a purely deceptive 
invention? Where is the benefit to the deceived public? First, when 
consumers are deceived, there are already increased search costs as the 
consumer seeks to find out what the product actually is. Then, if 
 
 135.  Letter from Jefferson to Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 440, 442–43 (Julian P. Boyd & Mina R. Bryan eds., 1956). 
 136.  Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 16–21 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1958) (footnote omitted). 
 137.  13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery 
Bergh eds., 1904). 
 138.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For analysis on the context and interpretations of the 
Intellectual Property Clause see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: 
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1771 (2006). 
 139.  DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 44 (3d ed. 2004) 
(“Locke’s natural rights theory and its impact with respect to intellectual property is dubious.”) 
For arguments that the Intellectual Property Clause is a property right see Adam Mossoff, Who 
Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in 
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007). But see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 5–10 (1966). 
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the  consumer is deceived as to the product’s nature, there are 
additional costs associated with finding the product they thought they 
were purchasing in the first place.140 If a patent is already “dead 
weight”141 on the market, to the extent that it exacts tolls from 
the  public,142 must we add additional search costs by condoning 
deceptive  patents? 
Second, it is unclear how novelty and obviousness, bars to 
patentability, would be evaluated for deceptive inventions. If a solely 
deceptive invention meets the standard for utility, such as the ‘405 
patent in Juicy Whip I, what constitutes novelty?143 Would the next 
deceptive invention have to exceed the deceptiveness of the first to be 
non-obvious? Would we assume the person having ordinary skill in the 
art possesses a certain amount of malignity? 
Finally, if we are “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts” through patent law,144 is the government promoting consumer 
deception? Are we seeking to progress the art of deception? Do the 
makers of deceptive products deserve penalties in other areas of 
commerce yet a windfall in the patent realm? It would be duplicitous 
for Congress to establish trademark law to reduce consumer confusion 
and deception and, on the other hand, provide incentives in patent 
 
 140.  Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 67 (2012). These are search costs not for a particular brand of product, but for a 
particular quality of product (natural v. artificial juice), which can be directly correlated from 
trademark law into deceptive patent features. 
 141. Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the Patent System Stack Up 
in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 82 (2004) (“The patent system also generates 
inefficiencies: The patentee’s exclusive rights permit it to charge super-competitive prices for the 
patented product, with the result that some potential customers who value the invention at more 
than its cost of production but at less than the price charged by the patentee go unserved. In 
the language of economists, this is a deadweight loss, or a loss to society resulting from a 
misallocation of resources.”). 
 142. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) 
(emphasis added) (“Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The 
Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted. The invention, to justify a patent, 
had to serve the ends of science—to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; 
to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge.”). 
 143. Bilski v. Kappos 561 U.S. 593, 655 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“As early as the 
19th century, we explained that the patent laws are not intended to ‘creat[e] . . . monopolies, 
which enable [inventors] to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without 
contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts.’” (quoting Atlantic Works v. Brady, 
107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883))). 
 144.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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law to promote and encourage consumer deception. Surely, this is not 
what Congress intended. 
V. AGAINST REVIVING MORAL UTILITY 
Of course, it is difficult to fully gauge which industries may be 
affected by a change in the moral utility doctrine. After all, who could 
have foreseen that a patent on a juice dispenser could undo the 
longstanding moral utility doctrine. Legal commentaries often argue 
for or against the implementation of moral utility in the field of 
biotechnology,145 however, depending how the moral bar to 
patentability is implemented it could have broad or narrow effects on 
various industries.  
Two noteworthy industries that may be affected are gambling and 
biotechnology. With the background presented in this paper we could 
parse the moral utility doctrine into two views: an expansive view,146 
set forth by Justice Story and comprising any immoral invention, and 
a restricted view, encompassing point-of-sale deception.147 Under the 
restricted view, for which this paper advocates, gambling patents are 
most at risk. Yet, under a more expansive view biotechnology patents 
could also be at risk.  
Although only some gambling patents would be at risk, there are 
major economic incentives keeping the gambling industry 
undisturbed. Gambling is a mainstay for some states, such as Nevada. 
It is also a very lucrative business that brings U.S. merchants $240 
billion every year.148 However, gambling machines employ various 
 
 145.  A large majority of recent publications on the moral utility doctrine have focused on 
biotechnology. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and 
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003); Benjamin D. Enerson, Note, 
Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility 
Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2004); Laura A. Keay, Morality’s Move Within U.S. Patent 
Law: From Moral Utility to Subject Matter, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 409, 411 (2012). 
 146.  See supra Section II.A. 
 147.  See supra Section III.B.2. 
 148.  Kimberly Pierceall, The US Gambling Industry Is Worth $240 Billion, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sep. 30, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-gambling-industry-is-
worth-240-billion-2014-9. 
5.Spiel.FIN.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  4:06 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
774 
forms of psychological trickery, such as “near misses,”149 that are 
deceptive in nature.150 Taken together, these gambling devices would 
not be patentable under a restricted view of moral utility, because they 
promote deception at the point of sale.151 This measure may be fiercely 
opposed by the gambling industry, but it is merely a necessary initial 
step in introducing consumer protection to gambling devices.152 After 
all, a rejected patent is not the death knell for any technology, only an 
indication that the technology is undeserving of a state-sanctioned 
monopoly. As discussed throughout this paper, deceptive patents are 
incongruous with multiple areas of the law, and their undoing justifies 
the incidental effects the moral utility doctrine would have on some 
gambling patents.  
The primary concern  associated with reviving a broad view of the 
moral utility doctrine is the effect it will have on biotechnology.153 
Biotechnology has evolved exponentially over the past few decades. 
This has also allowed scientists to perform unimaginable tests and 
perfect life-enhancing alterations, but it has also allowed scientists to 
play God through cloning and gene editing technologies.154 
CRISPR/CAS9, a recently discovered gene editing technique, holds 
 
 149.  See generally Ferris Jabr, How the Brain Gets Addicted to Gambling, SCI. AM. 
(Nov.  1,  2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-brain-gets-addicted-
to-gambling. 
  150.  John Rosengren, How Casinos Enable Gambling Addicts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/losing-it-all/505814 (explaining 
that “near misses,” deliberately misleading features, are included in many gaming 
machines). Nelson Rose, one of the world’s leading experts on gaming law, notes that 
Nevada regulations operate on the theory that a sophisticated player would be able to 
tell the real odds of winning by playing a machine long enough. The gambling 
industry maintains that deceptive near misses do not occur in North American gaming 
machines, but as Schüll has noted, it has developed a more narrow definition 
of deceptive near misses, which still allows for ‘subliminal inducements.’ 
Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (“Informed choice [is] the central tenet of consumer protection, which is why 
when you apply for a loan, the bank has to tell you the interest rate and how it’s calculated. It’s 
why many state lotteries have to disclose their odds, and it’s why even the contests on the backs 
of cereal boxes list the chances of winning a prize. Yet such essential disclosure is not required 
of electronic gaming machines.”). 
   153.  See supra note 145. 
 154.  See David Benjamin Turitz Cox et al., Theraputic Genome Editing: Prospects and 
Challenges, 21 NATURE MED. 121 (2015). 
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immense promise.155 Through this technique many, if not all, genetic 
diseases could be cured,156 but researchers could also use this 
technique to form chimeras,157 human-animal species. Thus, the 
technology would have vast use in society, but it might also cross into 
an unethical realm. Some think these patents should exist to promote 
life-saving technologies,158 while others argue patents are unnecessary 
to promote this type of biotechnological innovation.159 Scholars have 
advocated for the revival of the moral utility doctrine to block 
biotechnology patents because of their potential moral failures,160 but 
this paper strictly proposes reviving the moral utility doctrine for 
deceptive patents.  
Strong opinions are involved wherever morals are at issue, so there 
is no “easy” answer, but this Note has sought to simplify the analysis 
by analyzing a distinct subcategory: deceptive patents. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The legislature or judiciary should carve out an exception to 
patentability, specifically prohibiting point-of-sale deception for patent 
applications. It would not be the first time the legislature has carved 
out an exception, as indicated by the court in Juicy Whip I.161 This 
restriction to patentability would not be new, only a return to 
principles that guided the previous 180 years of American patent law. 
In part, I agree with the Juicy Whip I court. The legislature should 
enact a law preventing deceptive patents. However, I do not believe 
the Federal Circuit had sufficient grounds to forsake the doctrine in 
the first place. Congress’s silence on the moral utility doctrine is not a 
denunciation of it. Moral utility is a fundamental aspect of patent law 
and can be traced to intellectual property’s very origins. It plays a 
 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Megan Molteni, CRISPR May Cure All Genetic Disease—One Day, WIRED (June 7, 
2017, 5:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/06/crispr-may-cure-genetic-disease-one-day. 
 157.  Megan Molteni, First Human-Pig Chimera is a Step Toward Custom Organs, WIRED 
(Jan. 26, 2017, 3:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/first-human-pig-chimera-step-
toward-custom-organs/. 
 158.  See Enerson, supra note 145, at 685. 
 159.  See Bagley, supra note 145, at 469. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (Juicy Whip I), 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress previously exempted special nuclear material and atomic 
weapons from patentability). 
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complementary role to other doctrines that prevent consumer 
deception and should be embraced, either judicially or legislatively, as 
an inherent principle of the Intellectual Property Clause. 
I do not take the position that all deception is bad, only the 
deception that occurs when consumers make a value judgment about 
the quality of goods at the point of sale. Post-sale confusion and initial 
interest confusion may serve a useful function, as the court indicated, 
through imitative products such as cubic zirconium, laminate flooring, 
or any number of articles brought about through the Industrial 
Revolution. However, indistinguishable imitative features become 
more pernicious the nearer a purchaser is to the point of sale. 
Neither do I advocate the prohibition of deceptive inventions 
entirely. That is not the prerogative of the Patent and Trademark 
Office. That, as the court in Juicy Whip I correctly stated, is the job of 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug 
Administration, to “protect[] consumers from fraud and deception in 
the sale of food products.”162 The Patent and Trademark Office’s 
responsibility is to promote the progress of science and arts. To 
promote a practice is appreciably different from prohibiting a practice 
or merely allowing it to occur. This is the point that the court in Juicy 
Whip I failed to acknowledge: if the deceptive feature has utility to the 
consumer, it will prevail without the endorsement of a quasi-
monopoly. A rejection to patentability is not the death knell for an 
invention. In fact, the Supreme Court, and many others, have 
questioned whether patents are even necessary to encourage certain 
forms of innovation.163 
The Federal Circuit’s acquiescence of deceptive patents in Juicy 
Whip I not only cuts against moral utility precedent and sound public 
policy, but also conflicts with trademark, free speech, and federal code 
prohibitions. The legislature or judiciary should take steps to 
implement the deceptiveness bar to patentability to promote true 
 
 162.  Id. 
   163.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 651 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding the 
large majority of business methods unpatentable). “Many have expressed serious doubts about 
whether patents are necessary to encourage business innovation.” Id. 
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innovation, prevent dead-weight loss, and ensure that “the stream of 




 164.  Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
772 (1976). 
∗ J.D., April 2017, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
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